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Executive Summary 
The Homeland Security Act (HSA), enacted in November 2002, created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The legislation combined twenty-two existing 
agencies and 170,000 federal employees into a new cabinet-level department-the largest 
and most complex reorganization of the federal government since the creation of the 
Department of Defense nearly six decades earlier. Included in this legislation was authority 
for the Department to initiate new approaches to personnel management outside of the 
normal rules of the federal civil service. This new personnel management authority was 
potentially the most significant change in civil service law since the Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1978 (CSRA). The personnel management provision of the HSA also turned out to be 
among the most contentious provisions of the proposed law, tying up final passage of the 
legislation until after the mid-term elections in November 2002 and pitting the administration 
and major federal employee unions against one another in a hard-fought battle for support on 
Capitol Hill. 
This report is an analytical case history of the passage of HSA, focused on the 
personnel management section. It includes a review of the recent history of civil service 
reform, a chronology of the major events leading up to passage of the legislation, and a 
detailed examination of the rhetorical framing of the debate over the legislation, which we 
conclude offers a powerful explanation for the passage of the legislation. In examining the 
case, we also suggest some important implications for implementation of personnel 
management reform. This analysis is based on a review of public documents and on 
interviews with key participants. 
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Civil Service Reform 
For much of the early history of the United States, the federal government was small, 
and government workers were little more than clerks. Positions in government often were 
given to political supporters of elected officials. As the government grew, so did this system 
of patronage, until it reached its high point in the "spoils system." The first major reform of 
this system came on the heels of the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled 
office seeker. The Pendleton Act of 1893 created the first modern civil service system, 
overseen by a Civil Service Commission. Civil service employment was based on selection 
according to qualification, and promotion would be based on merit. Selection and promotion 
were to be free from political influence. 
This system survived until 1978 when the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) made 
significant changes. The CSRA abolished the old Civil Service Commission, replacing it 
with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB) and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The CSRA instituted a system 
of merit pay based on performance and created a new upper-level Senior Executive Service 
(SES). Many observers have been disappointed with the outcomes of the CSRA. Two 
attempts at pay-for-performance failed and were abandoned; OPM has not achieved the 
anticipated status; the SES failed to produce the hoped-for cadre of highly mobile senior civil 
servants; and personnel management has become complex, unresponsive, and rules-bound. 
The common view held that another round of civil service reform was needed. But attempts 
at government-wide, large-scale reform have been unsuccessful. Instead, successive 
Presidential administrations have used demonstration projects and other limited and 
incremental steps to achieve smaller scale reforms. Congress has also enacted important but 
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smaller-scale targeted reforms. President George W. Bush's administration has had a 
particular focus on management issues, and homeland security offered an opportunity to 
advance a proposal for personnel management reform in the new department. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
After 9111, the White House established an Office of Homeland Security in the 
Executive Office of the President. Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was appointed the 
President's senior advisor for Homeland Security. But, even before 9/11, some in Congress 
had been pushing for creation of a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Defense----chief 
among them Senator Joseph Lieberman, chairman of the Senate Government Affairs 
Committee. The administration initially rejected the idea of a new cabinet department, but 
faced with increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, the administration set about to draft a 
proposal for a homeland security department. A small group of five White House staff 
members, overseen by a senior-level group, was charged with designing the new department. 
They worked in secret in the President's Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) . 
. On June 6, 2002, the White House announced its proposal for a new Department of 
Homeland Security. The administration spoke generally about the need for management 
flexibility in the new department. The Republican leadership on Capitol Hill asked for draft 
legislation quickly, and the staff group worked with OPM and others to draft the legislation 
that was sent to Congress on June 18, 2002. The proposed legislation gave the DHS secretary 
and OPM director authority to institute a new personnel management system 
"notwithstanding" the provisions of Title 5 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) which governs federal 
civilian personnel management. Homeland Security Advisor Ridge and OPM Director Kay 
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Cole James took the lead for the administration in testifying before Congress and in the 
behind-the-scenes meetings to promote the legislation. 
Union opposition to the personnel management provision was strong. The American 
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) and the National Treasury Employees Union 
(NTEU) asserted that the personnel management proposal threatened collective bargaining 
agreements and eliminated protections for federal workers. Both sides claimed that they were 
willing to consult and compromise, but the personnel management issues were not resolved; 
the legislation remained un-enacted heading into the 2002 elections. Both sides took the fight 
into the November election. The administration charged the unions and their Democratic 
supporters with holding up legislation that was important to "national security," and the 
unions charged the Republican Congress and White House with threatening workers' rights. 
On Election Day, two incumbent Democratic senators were defeated in campaigns where 
these issues were prominent. When Congress reconvened after the election, the legislation 
was enacted. 
Rhetorical Analysis 
The public debate over the personnel management provision, on Capitol Hill and 
during the 2002 elections, can help to explain the passage of the legislation with its personnel 
management reforms. Prior to 9/11, the debate over civil service reform was stalemated, as 
both sides argued over issues such as strategic human capital management, modernization, 
flexibility, accountability, broadbanding and paybanding, performance-based pay, 
recruitment and retention, union busting and partisan differences. Our analysis shows that all 
of these issues were argued over in the post-9/11 period, as well. But after 9/11, the 
proponents of reform cloaked the management argument in the larger context of national 
security. Each of the issues of debate prior to 9/11, to varying degrees, took on a national 
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security element. In addition, a whole new broad national security argument emerged. On the 
surface, the debate seemed to have changed from management flexibility vs. workers' rights 
to national security vs. union collective bargaining. Yet, when the debate is examined more 
deeply, it is clear that even when both sides engaged in a national security debate, the 
administration made the more powerful national security arguments in the way it framed the 
discussion, especially in matters of strategy, protection and power. These differences appear 
to have been highly influential in favor of reform. 
Discussion 
A number of themes and important issues are raised in this case history. The 
following is a brief synopsis of each of them. 
Secrecy and General Language. The process used by the White House to draft the 
proposal that was presented to the Cabinet and sent to Congress was an exception to the 
norm. The proposal was drafted in secret by a small staff group in the White House. It was 
not coordinated with affected departments or agencies. This process had advantages as well 
as some offsetting negative consequences. It proved successful in getting a proposal done in 
a timely manner, but that also meant that the concerns of interested parties were not 
addressed until the issue was in the public domain where the debates took on a more strident 
and uncompromising tone. 
The initial public White House discussion of a proposal for a Department of 
Homeland Security addressed only a general need for management flexibility. As some of 
the members acknowledged in interviews for this study, the staff group lacked expertise in 
civil service laws and rules, so when it came time for the proposal to be put into legislative 
language, experts from OPM had to be consulted, but with little time for detailed work. 
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Therefore, the bill was written in very general language. This also had its advantages and 
disadvantages. The less detail there was in the bill, the less there was to be debated, argued 
and amended. On the other hand, a paucity of detail paved the way for critiques by the 
opposition. 
Congressional Processes and Interest Groups. The differences in the ways in which 
the House and Senate acted on the Homeland Security bill were important. In the House, 
controlled by the Republicans, action on the President's bill was fast, coordinated, and led by 
the Republican leadership. The Senate, however, was split evenly along party lines. The 
political dynamics in the Senate were very different from those of the House, and efforts to 
expedite a floor vote were frustrated by the inability to invoke cloture. The Senate 
Republican leadership in the Senate could not expedite the President's bill as did their 
counterparts in the House. The influence of a single interest group was a significant factor, 
particularly in the Senate. The ability of the federal employee unions to raise issues and 
mobilize supporters in the Senate led to contentious debate and delay beyond initial 
expectations. 
Rhetoric and the Election Outcome. The outcome of the 2002 congressional 
elections decided the outcome of the HSA. Republicans gained the majority in the Senate 
and expanded their margin in the House. Pivotal campaigns were influenced, if not decided, 
on issues surrounding the HSA. The legislative fight had been taken into the political arena, 
and the election outcome decided the legislative outcome. 
Intent. There are differing views about the intentions behind the HSA personnel 
provision. Was the intent to use HSA to bring about broader civil service reform? The OPM 
staff members who worked on the language and subsequent regulations say they were 
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focused only on DHS. Yet, others involved in the process saw implications that DHS could 
be the starting point for wider reform. For the staff of OPM, the focus was on DHS; for the 
White House staff group that drafted the proposal, the focus was DHS with implications for 
advancing the administration's management reforms; and perhaps for the most senior White 
House officials, the objective was to set the course for widespread reform. Subsequent 
enactment of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) for the Department of Defense 
and the administration's proposed Working for America Act are further evidence of the 
White House commitment to personnel management reform throughout the federal 
government. 
Thus we reach these observations: 
• The strategies of secrecy and general language were very effective, at least for 
the short-term goals of drafting and enacting the legislation. However, later 
developments, beyond the scope of the present study, suggest that the result of 
secrecy and generality has been that the detailed issues must now be fought out 
after enactment, in the context of legal challenges and regulation-writing. The 
price of secrecy and generality in the design and enactment phases may very 
well be delay and discord during the implementation phase. If questions of 
politics and policy were not addressed prior to enactment, they must be 
addressed afterward. It is possible that some of the key problems encountered in 
the legislative battles, and perhaps now in the implementation phase, could have 
been tempered by earlier OPM involvement 
• The elections were decisive for HSA, and passage of the legislation can be 
largely explained by the power of the rhetorical framing of the debate. 
• There is the suggestion of both opportunism and intention on the question of 
whether HSA is the beginning of widespread civil service reform. The question 
of intention may depend on the level of the policy maker, but in any case, the 
reform is spreading, albeit with implementation problems. 
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Conclusion 
The story of the Homeland Security Act is a rare alignment of policy environment, 
policy opportunity, politics, and rhetorical framing. The result was enactment oflegislation 
that many believe would not otherwise have been possible. Why did the confluence of this 
particular policy environment, policy opportunity, and politics combine to result in 
enactment of controversial civil service reform? One powerful explanation is the framing of 
the debate and the rhetorical framing that each side employed. Simple stated, the supporters 
of reform presented their arguments in terms of national security; their opponents argued in 
terms of collective bargaining rights. In the post-9fll policy environment, "national 
security" was a political trump card. If the first civil service reform was triggered by a 




The Homeland Security Act (HSA), passed by Congress and signed by President 
George W. Bush in November 2002, created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
The legislation, a response to the new security threat presented by the attacks on New York 
and Washington on September 11, 2001, combined twenty-two existing agencies and 
170,000 federal employees into a new cabinet-level department. This action represented the 
largest and most complex reorganization of the federal government since the creation of the 
Department of Defense after World War II. Included in this legislation was new authority 
for the Department to initiate new approaches to personnel management outside of the 
normal rules of the federal civil service. This new personnel management authority was the 
most significant change in civil service law since the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
(CSRA). The personnel management provision of the HSA also turned out to be the most 
contentious provision of the proposed law, tying up final passage of the legislation until after 
the mid-term elections in November 2002, and pitting the administration and major public 
sector unions against one another in a hard-fought battle for support on Capitol Hill. The civil 
service reforms in the HSA of 2002 have been labeled "Trojan horse politics,"1 called 
"politically clever,"2 and referred to as an "aggressive campaign to dismantle the federal civil 
1 Donald P. Moynihan, "Homeland Security and the U.S. Public Management Policy Agenda," Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 18, no. 2 (2005): 171-196. 
2 David Firestone and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Stalemate Ends In Bush Victory on Terror Bill," New York Times, 
13 November 2002, AI. 
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service."3 Though ultimately successful in achieving passage of the legislation, the 
administration is still facing political and legal challenges to its implementation. 
This report is an analytical case history of the passage of HSA, focused on the 
personnel management section. It includes a review of the recent history of civil service 
reform, a chronology of the major events leading up to passage of the legislation, and an 
examination of the issues, strategies and arguments. We have analyzed the case for the 
education it can provide and the questions it raises about civil service policy-making. 
B. Methodology 
We have approached this project from the perspectives of two scholarly fields that are 
not commonly joined-Public Policy and Rhetorical Communication. This case involves 
issues of policymaking and executive-legislative relations familiar to the student of politics 
and public policy. At the same time, an examination of communications strategies and 
themes is essential to understanding the legislative outcome. Accordingly, we have employed 
an interdisciplinary approach that we believe enriches the story and the analysis. Initially, we 
conducted an extensive search of public documents and materials in order to determine 
background information, identify the key actors, and examine the processes and 
communication in drafting and presenting the legislation. Secondly, we conducted interviews 
with many of the people involved to further develop the story of the case. In examining the 
debate over the legislation, we analyzed the publicly available materials and extracted the 
arguments for and against the legislation. The analysis was confined as much as possible to 
direct quotations, which were categorized into themes according to rhetorical strategies and 
the potential effects the arguments may have had on key audiences. Finally, we have 
3 American Federation of Government Employees, Homeland Security Talking Points. 
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attempted to merge the narrative history with rhetorical and policy analyses into a coherent 
presentation of what happened and why the legislation was enacted. 
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II. A Brief History of US Civil Service Reform 
A. Jacksonian Democracy and the "Spoils System" 
Today's federal worker must be knowledgeable, skilled, educated, and able to adapt 
to the ever-changing technologies and social advancements of society. This has not always 
been the case. For most of the nation's first century, federal workers were likely to have 
secured their jobs through political placement rather than because of their knowledge and 
skills. This system of political patronage reached its peak in the administration of President 
Andrew Jackson. "Jacksonian democracy" justified political patronage by arguing that 
representation of politically loyal common people in the federal bureaucracy was a logical 
extension of democracy. But the federal government was becoming a larger and more 
complex organization. The number of federal employees had swelled from just 20,000 prior 
to the Civil War to 132,000 in 1883.4 Incompetence, corruption and high turnover after each 
election became associated with the patronage system. The resulting costs of the patronage 
system were becoming apparent by the late nineteenth century. 
B. The Pendleton Act and the Birth of the Merit System 
Reform would require a dramatic event. The assassination of President Garfield by a 
disgruntled office-seeker gave life to the reform cause. On May 15, 1882, Senator George H. 
Pendleton of Ohio, chairman of the Senate Committee on Civil Service Reform and backed 
by the National Service Reform League, sponsored a bill to introduce merit system principles 
4 Office of Personnel Management, Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service, accessed 22 
July 2005: available from http://www.opm.gov/BiographyofAnldeal/ 
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into the federal government, replacing the long-established practices ofpatronage.5 In 
November, 1882, Republicans lost the majority in Congress in an election that turned on the 
issue of reform of the spoils system. The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act was passed by 
Congress and signed into law by President Chester Arthur on January 18, 1883. As we shall 
see in the present case, an election outcome--one hundred twenty years later-would also 
lead to civil service reform. 
The Pendleton Act established the bipartisan Civil Service Commission. It provided 
that federal workers would be "hired on the basis of merit, promoted within the framework of 
civil service rules, are not to be explicitly involved in political campaigns and ... once beyond 
a probationary period, essentially have job tenure."6 Originally, only about ten percent of 
federal workers were covered by the Act, but this coverage steadily expanded to virtually all 
civilian federal employees. 
C. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) was the first major reform of the civil 
service law to be enacted since the Pendleton Act. President Carter's Personnel Management 
Project designed CSRA, which was part of the Carter administration's Reorganization 
Project to make the federal government more businesslike and efficient. Though the 
principles of merit were always an explicit part of the Pendleton civil service system, the 
definition of merit had never been clearly outlined in law. Title I of the CSRA enumerated 
the foHowing as principles of merit: diversity, talent, fair treatment of employees, equality of 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ronald L. Johnson, "Patronage to Merit and Control of the Federal Government Labor Force," Explorations in 
Economic History 31 (1994): 91-2. 
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reward, integrity, efficiency, adequate performance, protection from adverse action for 
partisan political reasons, and protection for whistleblowers.7 
The key provisions of CSRA included: 
Abolition of the Civil Service Commission and creation ofthe Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) to be the central personnel management 
agency, the Federal Labor Relations Board (FLRB) to oversee labor-
management relations, and the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) to 
enforce and adjudicate merit principles in federal employment. 
Creation of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and merit-based .initiatives for 
senior managers. 
A new performance appraisal system to replace the out-dated performance rating 
system. 
Linking pay to performance through a new merit pay system for mid-level 
federal managers. 
Authority to conduct demonstration projects in order to experiment with various 
personnel systems and policies. 
Defined labor relations administration between union representation and 
management of the Federal Civil Service.s 
CSRA was seen as a system based on merit that would remain flexible with the 
changing environment of government while also protecting civil servants from political 
influence. President Carter envisioned a system that would be created from within, would be 
accepted by the system as a whole, and would be contemporary and flexible enough to 
organize and manage the government for the next 100 years.9 
However, reviews of CSRA implementation were not favorable. At the five-year 
point, CSRA had run into pay problems and the changing priorities of a new administration. 
At the ten-year point, the general conclusion was that CSRA had fallen short of its lofty 
7 Donald P. Moynihan, "Protection versus Flexibility: The Civil Service Reform Act, Competing Administrative 
Doctrines, and the Roots of Contemporary Public Management Debate," The Journal of Policy History 16, no. 1 
F004): 4. 
Ibid. 
9 Office of Personnel Management, Biography of an Ideal. 
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objectives. For instance, pay-for-performance had failed twice due to problems in funding 
and implementation. The SES had failed to become the elite, mobile, senior executive corps 
that its founders had envisioned as most senior executives did not move between top 
management positions. OPM did not achieve the hoped-for status on a par with the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) in personnel policy and management. And federal 
personnel management came to be characterized by complex rules. By the twenty-year 
anniversary of the CSRA, the focus on civil service seemed to be targeting a future reform 
agenda for a merit system that would support better efficiency, effectiveness and improved 
governmental performance.10 
D. Reform Initiatives of Recent Administrations 
A review of personnel management initiatives of recent administrations indicates that 
successive Presidential administrations have used demonstration projects and other limited 
and incremental steps to achieve smaller-scale reforms civil service reforms. Congress has 
also enacted important but smaller-scale, more targeted reforms. Attempts at government-
wide, large-scale reform, however, have been unsuccessful. 
1. Reagan Administration 
Federal personnel management under CSRA began with President Jimmy Carter. 
The succeeding president, Ronald Reagan, sought to utilize key provisions of CSRA to 
increase the responsiveness of the civil service to the Executive branch by strategically 
10 See Douglas A. Brook, "Merit and the Civil Service Reform Act," in The Future of Merit, ed. James P. 
Pfiffner and Douglas A. Brook (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 4-10. 
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appointing key personnel in order to carry through his administration's policy agenda. 11 Also, 
just as his predecessor had done, President Reagan continued to push for reduced 
bureaucracy and streamlined procedures for improving performance. In 1986, President 
Reagan proposed the Civil Service Simplification Act "which proposed to exempt some 
federal agencies from many centralized civil service requirements and standards, while 
keeping other agencies in the centralized fold." Although the Civil Service Simplification 
Act did not pass, many of its components became a consistent part of the reform dialogue.12 
In addition to President Reagan's effort to continue reforming the civil service system 
through legislation, an alternative approach, piecemeal and less visible, was already 
underway. Demonstration projects, authorized under Title VI ofCRSA enabled OPM to 
waive federal rules to allow agencies to experiment with personnel management innovations. 
The experiments were to be evaluated by OPM in order to learn lessons that might be applied 
to the rest of the government.13 For example, the demonstration project at the Naval Air 
Warfare Center Weapons Division at China Lake, California operated a pay-for-performance 
system for over twenty-five years. The China Lake demonstration project sought to "develop 
an integrated approach to pay, performance appraisal, and classification; allow greater 
managerial control over personnel functions; and expand the opportunities available to 
employees through a more responsive and flexible personnel system."14 This demonstration 
project, initiated in 1980, was able to achieve the type of results that had been envisioned by 
11 Office of Personnel Management, Biography of an Ideal. 
12 Patricia W. Ingraham, "A Laggard's Tale: Civil Service and Administrative Reform in the United States," paper prepared 
for the Conference on Comparative Civil Service Reform (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 5-8 April 1997),2. 
13 Donald P. Moynihan, "Protection versus Flexibility," 6. 
14 US Government Accountability Office, Human Capital Implementing Pay for Performance at Selected 
Personnel Demonstration Projects, GAO-04-83 (Washington, DC: January 2004). 
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I 
CSRA. Eventually, the China Lake demonstration project became a permanent personnel 
management system when it was signed into law in 1994.15 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated a demonstration 
project in 1986 to promote better hiring and retention. This project used alternative 
personnel management practices in hiring and retaining qualified personnel in highly skilled 
positions. Over a period often years, the project competed effectively with comparable 
private sector employers in compensation and retention by employing selective bonuses and 
merit increases, giving managers greater authority over pay and hiring decisions, and creating 
an employee environment that trusted the rules and regulations directing their duties.16 
2. The George H. W. Bush Administration 
The next administration, under President George H. W. Bush, was faced with the 
public's eroding perception of the federal service. Bush and OPM Director Constance Berry 
Newman undertook a series of aggressive initiatives to improve confidence in the public 
service and to attract and retain quality employees. President Bush successfully achieved 
legislation to close the pay gap between the private and public sectors, vetoed the 1990 Hatch 
Act Reform Amendment that would have allowed federal workers to actively participate in 
political parties, and endorsed legislation on protecting employees who report fraud, waste 
and abuse through the Whistleblowers Protection Act (WPA).17 
Other measures were still being suggested and enacted to reform the federal civil 





Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). The legislation granted 
several financial regulatory agencies independence to establish their own compensation 
systems. The drive to obtain FIRREA-type compensation flexibilities continued over the next 
decade.18 
3. The Clinton Administration 
Just as President Carter had come into office with a management reform agenda that 
included plans to fix the civil service system, President Clinton came into office with plans to 
reinvent government that included plans to improve personnel management. "Reinventing 
government" was a broad initiative focused on ridding government bureaucracies of red tape 
and unnecessary idiosyncrasies that foster inefficiencies. It emphasized downsizing the 
federal workforce, providing broader-based training to its personnel for wider employability, 
and initiating employment flexibilities in order to empower employees through practices 
allowable in the private sector but never before offered within the federal government. One 
such initiative came through three executive orders issued by President Clinton to establish a 
National Partnership Council and to mandate labor-management "partnerships" in federal 
agencies. Agencies were to form labor-management committees, involve employees and 
union representatives as full partners with management to identify problems and craft 
solutions, provide training in consensual methods of dispute resolution, negotiate over 
subjects permissible under Title 5, and evaluate progress under these partnerships.19 
18 Doris Hausser, OPM, e-mail to author, June 5, 2006 
19 Bill Clinton, "Labor Management Partnerships," Presidential Executive Order N 12871, 1 October 1993. 
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The Clinton-Gore National Performance Review (NPR) of 1993 recommended 384 
changes to the federal government, including the following in human resource management: 
(1) Create a flexible and responsive hiring system; (2) Reform the general schedule 
classification and basic pay system; (3) Authorize agencies to develop programs for 
improvement of individual and organizational performance; and (4) Authorize agencies to 
develop incentive award and bonus systems to improve individual and organizational 
performance. 20 
Attempts at wholly reinventing the entire federal government met with mixed results, 
but there were other attempts by the Clinton administration to restructure the civil service. 
The Workforce Restructuring Act was aimed at reducing the number of federal employees. 
These reductions were often accomplished through reductions in hiring or placing a freeze on 
hiring and, ironically, are now blamed for contributing to the looming retirement crisis.21 
The proposed Personnel System Reinvention Act (PSRA) was intended to allow individual 
agencies to take control of the design, implementation and execution of their personnel 
systems. Although the bill originally went to Capitol Hill with labor support, it did not make 
it out of committee in either house.22 The Omnibus Civil Service Reform Act would have 
established fifteen demonstration projects, with five having no limitations on the numbers of 
people affected. Congress did not enact this legislation either.23 However, Congress did act 
on another, more targeted civil service reform when it removed the Federal Aviation 
20 United States Government Accountability Office, Management Reform: implementation of the National 
Performance Review's Recommendations, GAO/OCG-95-1 (Washington, DC: author, December 1994). 
21 United States Government Accountability Office, High-risk Series, GAO-O 1-263 (Washington, DC: author, 
January 2001). 
22 Patricia W. Ingraham, "A Laggard's Tale," 9. 
23 Ibid. 
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Administration from all Title 5 provisions. Getting out of Title 5 represented a kind of system 
disaggregation that also became attractive to other agencies.24 
The Clinton administration also attempted to make some innovative use of 
demonstration projects authorized under CSRA. Demonstration projects were authorized to 
test new methods or concepts in personnel management. The Clinton administration seemed 
to use some demonstration projects to exempt certain organizations from specific provisions 
of Title 5, to provide flexibilities that were not otherwise available.25 Title 5 provides legal 
coverage for all federal workers, establishes the general pay schedule for government 
employees, and has, therefore, been the legislative focus for civil service reforms. Most 
reforms up to this point had been legislated as exemptions from or changes to Title 5. 
Demonstration projects were undertaken in some agencies, including the Department 
of Commerce, Naval Sea Systems Command Warfare Centers (NAVSEA), Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL), Army and Air Force research laboratories, and the Acquisition Workforce 
Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo). The NA VSEA and NRL projects were 
initiated under the Laboratory Quality Improvement Program (LQIP), a joint-service effort to 
improve and streamline the business and management processes of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) laboratory community.26 The AcqDemo project, authorized by Congress in 
1996, provided management flexibility to facilitate a reconfiguration of the acquisition 
workforce, including a proposed 40-percent reduction in personnel. This project could have 
covered 95,000 personnel, but it encountered union opposition and only subsequently 
24 Doris Hausser, OPM, e-mail to author, June 5, 2006 
25 James R. Thompson, "The Civil Service Under Clinton," Review of Public Personnel Administration 21, no. 
2 (Summer 2001): 87-113. 
26 Ibid., 92. 
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covered about 5,000 personneP7 Congress also acted to provide certain personnel 
flexibilities for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This was the first time agency-specific 
chapters had been added to Title 5, setting the stage for future agency-specific chapters for 
NASA, the SEC, DOD and DHS. 
4. The George W. Bush Administration 
The George W. Bush administration came to office with both a policy agenda and a 
management focus. The Bush administration addressed its agenda for personnel 
management reform as part of the President's Management Agenda (PMA), begun in 2001, 
as a comprehensive program to identify management reforms and improve government 
performance in five key areas. One of these priority areas is the "Strategic Management of 
Human Capital." 
Also, in his first month in office, President Bush revoked the Clinton executive orders 
regarding labor-management partnerships and the requirement that agencies negotiate on 
discretionary subjects as authorized in Title 5.28 This action would later contribute to union 
opposition to HSA. According to NTEU president Colleen Kelly, this "sent a very clear 
message [ ... ] that this is what the administration thought of unions. So, from there, every 
opportunity they had to try to take away rights from employees and/or unions, they did."29 
Early personnel management reform initiatives growing out of the President's 
Management Agenda were the Freedom to Manage Act and the Managerial Flexibility Act. 
27 Ibid., 93. 
28 George Bush, "Revocation of Executive Order and Presidential Memorandum Concerning Labor-
Management Partnerships," Presidential Executive Order 13203, 17 February 200 l. 
29 Colleen Kelly, interview by authors, 22 September 2005. 
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The Freedom to Manage Act would allow agencies to identify and propose elimination of 
existing statutes that limited effective management and force Congress accept or reject the 
changes on a fast-track basis.3D This proposition was met with immediate controversy and 
quickly disappeared. The Managerial Flexibility Act sought to make specific amendments to 
Title 5, including additional management flexibilities in hiring critical personnel, greater 
authority for continued retirement incentives, ease of establishing demonstration projects, 
creation of individual agency personnel systems, and greater pay flexibilities to increase 
performance-based rewards.31 This legislation also failed to win sufficient support to become 
law. However, many of its provisions were later enacted, except those that would have 
expanded authority for demonstration projects or given OPM authority to establish 
permanent alternative personnel systems.32 The Bush administration was having no more 
success than its predecessors in pushing broad personnel management reform through 
Congress. According to Richard Falkenrath, Special Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Policy and Plans in the Office of Homeland Security: 
The President had a management agenda pre-9/II, and it wasn't getting any 
traction. The President's Management Agenda [ ... ] basically wanted to improve 
the quality of management in the federal Executive Branch. The hallmarks of 
[PMA] were: less Congressional micro-management, greater or broader 
statutory mandates, larger appropriations accounts, and executive discretion to 
hire and fire and control the departments. The philosophical essence of the 
President's Management Agenda was basically to treat department and agency 
heads like CEOs, and let them control their agencies.33 
3D Donald P. Moynihan, "Homeland Security," 175. 
31 Donald P. Moynihan, "Homeland Security," 176. 
32 Doris Hausser, OPM, e-mail to author, June 5, 2006. 
33 Richard Falkenrath, interview by authors, 22 September 2005. 
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Thus, the Bush administration had the policy framework for addressing personnel 
management reform in place prior to September 11. 
Before September 11, then, a succession of Presidents had proposed reforms in the 
management of federal personnel. Not all of the reforms proposed by the four 
administrations from Reagan to George W. Bush were identical, even though sometimes the 
language sounded similar. For instance, some focused on management "flexibility," some on 
employee "flexibility." It seemed that there was more consensus that a problem existed with 
personnel management in the federal government than agreement about the nature of the 
problem or the remedies to address it. But dissatisfaction with the status quo was 
widespread, with the personnel system generally regarded as a rules-bound barrier to 
effective and efficient government performance. Meanwhile, demonstration projects were 
experimenting successfully with new ways to recruit, retain, train, pay and provide incentives 
for federal employees and Congress was enacting a few targeted, incremental reforms. 
Though the large-scale reforms requiring legislation had failed to be enacted, the stage was 
set for reform should an opportunity arise. 
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III. Case History of Design and Enactment of Personnel 
Management Reform in the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 
On November 25,2002, President George W. Bush signed H.R. 5005, the Homeland 
Security Act of2002, into law. The Act directed the largest reorganization of the federal 
government since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. This chapter provides a 
case history of the enactment of this historic legislation, focusing on the personnel 
management provision of the bill. The case describes the political and policy environment 
preceding introduction of the administration's proposal, identifies the processes, 
organizations and people involved in designing the proposed legislation, describes the debate 
over the legislation including those who lobbied for and against it, and concludes with its 
enactment after the dramatic elections of November, 2002. 
A. Preceding Events 
Chapter II outlined the personnel management policy environment that preceded 
September 11, 2001, as a succession of Presidential administrations sought to improve the 
management of personnel in the federal government. Also preceding 9111, and increasingly 
thereafter, were efforts to improve the nation's preparedness for attacks on the homeland, 
specifically to create better federal organizational capability to deal with homeland security. 
1. Hart-Rudman Commission 
The Hart-Rudman Commission, led by former US Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. 
Rudman, was commissioned to conduct the most comprehensive review of American 
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security since the National Security Act of 1947.34 The commission worked between July 
1998 and February 2001, issuing reports in three phases. The commission recommended 
creation of a new National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for 
planning, coordinating, and integrating the various US government activities involved in 
homeland security.J5 The commission recommended that the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and the Customs Service 
be placed in this new agency. 
The commission discussed the faults within the federal civil service and 
recommended changes to ensure this system helped provide for the nation's security. The 
aging of the civil service workforce, the difficulty in hiring quickly, the need to retain 
Information Technology (IT) personnel, and the requirement for multi-lingual civil servants 
were among the issues they identified.J6 
The commission also suggested that the President develop a comprehensive strategy 
to heighten ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to 
respond to such attacks if prevention and protection failed. J7 But, the commission was 
operating under the belief that an attack could occur within the next quarter century; it did 
not foresee the attack that occurred on September 11, 2001. 
34 United States Commission on National Security121st Century, Roadmapfor National Security: Imperativefor 
Change. (Washington DC: author ). Available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/ 
35 United States Commission on National Security121st Century, Roadmapfor National Security: Addendum on 
Implementation, (Washington DC: author, 15 April 2001). Available from 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/addendumlImplementation Plans.pdf 
36 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Imperativefor Change. 
37 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Addendum on Implementation. 
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Others in the administration were also thinking about the need for a new organization 
for protecting the homeland. Joel Kaplan recalled: 
Prior even to September 11 th, in May of 2001, the Vice-President had been tasked 
with reviewing the organizational structure for weapons of mass destruction [and] 
counter-terrorism. He had hired Admiral Abbot to be the head of that office. I 
believe Admiral Abbot was supposed to start around September 5th or 10th . So, within 
the administration, there already [was] some thinking that we needed to look at how 
the government is organized for these sort of complex issues.38 
2. September 11, 2001 and after 
A major terrorist attack on the United States homeland was not predicted to happen so 
soon after the Hart-Rudman Commission issued its report, of course. But the attacks of 9/11 
provided the impetus for change, and they demonstrated the relevance of some of the 
Commission's findings. Professor Donald Moynihan describes the attacks as creating 
disequilibrium in the political system, which gave the President the opportunity to create 
change or reorganization.39 John Gartland, then Director of Legislative Affairs at the Office 
of Personnel Management, stated that without the attacks of 9111, personnel management 
reforms such as those in the HSA of 2002 would "not have seen the light of day."40 Richard 
Ryan refers to the birth ofDHS as a rare opportunity for President Bush to seize the 
momentum and implement personnel reform, perhaps even extending it throughout the entire 
federal govemment.41 
38 Joel Kaplan, interview by authors, 26 September, 2005. 
39 Donald P. Moynihan, "Homeland Security," 192. 
40 John Gartland, interview by authors, 28 August 2005. 
41 Richard W. Ryan, "The Department of Homeland Security Challenges the Federal Civil Service System: 
Personnel Lessons from a Department's Emergence," Public Administration & Management (3 August 2003): 
103. 
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3. Initial Attempts at Reorganization 
On October 8, 2001, the President issued an executive order that established an Office 
of Homeland Security (OHS) within the Executive Office of the President.42 Later that day, 
Governor Tom Ridge was named Director of OHS, and assumed the position of "Assistant to 
the President," a title like those of other senior White House counselors and policy advisors. 
Like other White House staff appointees employed at the President's discretion, Ridge did 
not occupy a statutory position, and his appointment did not require Senate confirmation.43 
While Ridge's status gave him a privileged advisory role to President Bush, it 
shielded him from Congress and limited the OHS budget to discretionary funds from the 
White House office budget.44 Director Ridge did not have either formal authority or budget 
control over many of the organizations he was to coordinate. Moreover, he was out of the 
reach of the Congress and, hence, not obligated to testify about matters related to OHS. Joel 
Kaplan explained these circumstances surrounding Ridge's position caused some tension: 
There was an issue with getting somebody to testify in front of the Congress. 
Congress wanted one person who could come up and testify about the government's 
Homeland Security efforts. There's a long-standing Executive Branch position that 
White House Assistants to the President, as opposed to [Senate-confirmed] cabinet 
secretaries, did not testify except only in rare instances [ ... ] Governor Ridge, as Head 
of Homeland Security, was an Assistant to the President. So, there was constant 
tension that [Congress] wanted somebody to come up and be accountable for all of 
the administration's efforts. That was a source of some friction.45 
42 George W. Bush, "Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security," Presidential Executive Order 
13228, 8 October 2001. 
43 Richard S. Conley, "The War on Terrorism and Homeland Security: Presidential and Congressional 
Challenges," paper prepared for the Conference, Assessing the Presidency of George W. Bush at Midpoint: 
Political, Ethical, and Historical Considerations, (GulfPort, MS: University of South em Mississippi, 22-23 
November 2002),6. 
44 Ibid., 6. 
45 Joel Kaplan, interview with authors, 26 September 2005. 
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On Capitol Hill, more elaborate organization designs dealing with homeland security 
began to appear. On May 5, 2002, Senator Joseph Liebennan (D-CT), a prospective 
Democrat presidential candidate, introduced a bill (S. 2452) to establish a Department of 
National Homeland Security and the National Office for Combating Terrorism. The head of 
the new department, who would be both a member of the Cabinet and the National Security 
Council, "would have the rank and power," said Senator Liebennan, "to ensure that the 
security of our homeland remains high on our national agenda, and that all necessary 
resources are made available toward that end."46 The bill was referred to the Government 
Affairs Committee, which Liebennan chaired and where he would start to move the bill 
quickly through committee consideration. The administration initially opposed the creation 
of a new cabinet department, but pressure for a new agency was building in Congress. At the 
same time, Director Ridge was facing administrative problems running his office. As 
reorganization proposals gained momentum on Capitol Hill, the idea of creating a new 
Department began to develop in the White House. 
A memo written by Richard Falkenrath, policy advisor to Ridge,47 proposed a new 
organization merging the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) into a border protection agency. According to Bruce Lawlor, White House 
Homeland Security Staff Senior Director for Protection and Prevention, this reorganization 
was needed because: 
at the time, when you approached the border, you had to go through about 
four different agencies to be processed through. It made no sense. We 
46 Harold C. Relyea, Homeland Security: Department Organization and Management, RL31493, (Washington 
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2002), 31. 
47 Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the September 12 Era (New York: Simon & Schuster), 285. 
- 21 -
literally had situations down in the southwest border where you had two 
highway lanes; one lane would be manned by Customs; one lane would be 
manned by the INS, with completely separate rules as to how people were 
processed into the country.48 
This reorganization encountered resistance from many in the Cabinet to whose 
Departments these agencies belonged. Joel Kaplan explained, "What you had was sort of 
natural jurisdictional, territorial pulls where everybody said, 'you can't remove this from my 
agency; it would be devastating.' It just ground to a halt.. .. "49 Bruce Lawlor said: 
We went out to all the departments. We engaged them; we talked to them; 
we showed them drafts. It was interactive. We tried to be collegial. We 
tried to [ ... ] come to some sort of consensus. There was resistance, and near 
the end [ ... ] there was a meeting of the principals, cabinet secretaries, before 
the President to consider this. It was presented; the cabinet secretaries 
almost went into revolt. And that was the end of it. 50 
4. White House Designs New DHS 
Regardless of resistance to the proposed border protection agency, President Bush 
instructed his chief of staff, Andrew Card, to come up with proposals for a homeland security 
department. Card organized a White House staff group to develop a homeland security 
agency proposal in secret, without explicit consultation with or advance notice to 
congressional leaders, cabinet secretaries, or agency heads.51 
The staff group that met secretly in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center 
(PEOC) was a working group of five White House staff, which would become known as the 
48 Bruce Lawlor, interview by authors, 23 September 2005. 
49 Joel Kaplan, interview, 26 September 2005. 
50 Bruce Lawlor, interview. 
51 Donald Moynihan, "Homeland Security," 178. 
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"G_5."52 They were Richard Falkenrath; Mark Everson, then comptroller of the Office of 
Federal Financial Management and later Deputy Director for Management of OMB; Joel 
Kaplan; Bruce Lawlor; and Brad Berenson, Associate Counsel to the President. The G-5 
group answered to an oversight group of administration principals: Chief of Staff Card; Josh 
Bolten, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy; Mitch Daniels, Director of OMB; White House 
counsel Alberto Gonzales; and Nick Calio, head of White House Legislative Liaison.53 This 
group was tasked with developing the concept for reorganizing the federal government to 
deal with homeland security. 
Members of the group worked in secret. Joel Kaplan explains, 
It was secret in the beginning because we wanted freedom of deliberation and 
real thought. It was a terrific process. Later, it was secret because there was a 
sense that we were sort of brought along kicking and screaming, and this was 
sort of going to happen anyway. But the truth is this was exceptionally hard to 
get done. Especially because of the Congressional jurisdictional problems and 
the fact that this has to be done as one fell swoop or else it'll never get done. 
It'll get nickel-and-dimed to death.54 
This potential opposition included Cabinet members, intent upon keeping their 
departments intact, Members of Congress who would attempt to protect their committee 
interests, and union leaders interested in maintaining their right to collective bargaining. 
5. Presidential Announcement of June 6, 2002 
On June 6, 2002, the President announced his proposal to create the Department of 
Homeland Security. The announcement was a planned, coordinated event orchestrated to 




announce the President's plan to all the key Washington players within a shOlt time frame. 
Lawlor states: 
We had a timed rollout strategy; it was quite remarkable. For a period of about 
three days, it was timed down to the half-hour, who was doing what, when it 
was going to happen, who was going to go on what show. I think the President 
or Andy Card notified the Speaker and the Majority Leader in the evening. In 
the morning there was a Cabinet meeting at nine o'clock. All the Cabinet 
members were there. The President walked in and said "This is what I'm going 
to do. Any questions?" It was the most wonderful thing I've ever seen: "This is 
what I'm going to do. I'm the President of the United States." [ ... ] It was a 
tremendous exercise of leadership. George Bush has got guts, and once they 
understood it, with maybe one exception, they all saluted and did what was 
right.55 
Management flexibility was addressed only in general terms at the time of the 
announcement. Briefing the press as a "senior administration official," Homeland Security 
Advisor Ridge said "it is our hope ... that as we send specific legislation to the Hill that this 
new cabinet secretary ... will be given the freedom to manage; i.e. we'd like to see some 
flexibility ... so that they can move people and resources around in times of crisis or 
emergency. I think that's critical."56 While the announcement itself was relatively 
straightforward, the proposal and the issues it addressed were rife with complexity. 
B. The President's Proposal for a Department of Homeland Security 
The designers of the DHS had many issues to address-including reorganizing 
numerous agencies and dealing the with the management challenges of integration. They 
also had an opportunity to create new approaches to organization and management rather 
55 Bruce Lawlor, interview. 
56 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Department of Homeland Security Press Briefing, "Press 
Briefing By a Senior Administration Official on President's Announcement on Homeland Security," June 6, 
2002, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/newsI2002/06/wh060602.html. visited June 22, 2006. 
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than simply replicate old bureaucracies. There were also practical issues to be dealt with like 
drafting legislation on a tight schedule and dealing with potential opposition. 
1. A New and Complex Organization 
The figures below illustrate the challenge of this reorganization. Figure 1 shows the 
many organizations, departments, and agencies involved in homeland security functions. 
I Major cabinel Departments and Agencles I 
In\IoIlIOd In Ilomoland Se",dy 
1liliiii1 'i 
Figure 1. Major Cabinet Departments and Agencies Involved in Homeland Security57 
Figure 1 illustrates the challenge for the White House Office of Homeland Security, 
trying to coordinate policy and tie organizations together with a unifying concept when they 
did not work within the same overall organization. Figure 2 depicts a reorganized 
department, streamlining the various functions under four main components: Information 
57 Department of Homeland Security. "Major Cabinet Departments and Agencies Involved in Homeland 
Security," Available from www.dhs.gov. 
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Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Border and 
Transportation Security, and Science and Technology. 
PRESIDENT 
Se'll£lte Coolirmed 0 
New O ltic6/ Agency 0 
Tr ansterroo A gency 0 
Di~tinct Erxity 0 
Source: Comp iled by U.s. Si!llOte 
Budget Comm fttm; Staff-
Frid:1y. N o v 15. 2002 
Figure 2. Department of Homeland Security Organization Chart58 
Bruce Lawlor discussed the organizational challenge: 
When we originally built the Department, if you think about it, you 've got 
information, critical infrastructure protection-that's two of your functions. That's 
one Directorate. We've got the borders, law enforcement and transportation security. 
There's another Directorate. And emergency response and recovery-that's the third 
Directorate. We only had three Directorates when we started. Then the Vice President 
came along and said, "You've got to do something more about bio-terrorism." That 's 
the fourth Directorate, Science and Technology.59 
58 Department of Homeland Security. "Department of Homeland Security Organization Chart," available from 
www.dhs.gov. 
59 Bruce Lawlor, interview. 
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The merger of twenty-two agencies posed large integration challenges in personnel 
management. The entities to be merged into DHS consisted of seventeen different unions, 
seventy-seven existing collective bargaining agreements, nineteen financial management 
systems, twenty-two human resources servicing offices, and eight payroll systems. Mason 
Alinger, Deputy Legislative Director of the House Committee on Government Reform, 
stated: 
You're melding together twenty-two different departments and agencies; you've got 
[170,000] employees;60 you've got seventy-two collective bargaining agreements; 
you've got all these different things. You can't put that stuff together, shove it in one 
box and pretend like it's going to work. 
That was our soundest argument: that we need to just let them wipe the slate clean 
and start with a new system or else this thing is doomed from the start.61 
Alinger suggests, therefore, that the mere act of merging disparate entities into a new 
department necessitated looking at a new system of personnel management. OPM's Doris 
Hausser explains: "Personnel management experts familiar with the entities that were to be 
combined were keenly aware ... that an extraordinary number of detailed agency specific 
legislative provisions affecting personnel management were embedded in their authorizing 
legislation. "62 
2. Management Issues 
Others, however, were more inclined to argue that it was the urgent nature ofthe 
mission of DHS that called for new approaches to management. The White House proposal 
addressed three important areas of "management flexibility": budget authority (the ability to 
60 In the interview, Mr. Alinger stated 500,000 rather than the actual 170,000 that were affected by HSA. We 
believe he may have confused the numbers for the Department of Defense NSPS reforms on which he also 
worked. 
61 Mason Alinger, interview by authors, 23 September 2005. 
62 Doris Hausser, OPM, e-mail to author, June 5, 2006. 
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reprogram funds), reorganization authority, and personnel management authority. About 
personnel management, Rep. Rob Portman (R-OH), a member of the House Select 
Committee on Homeland Security, said, "It's absolutely critical, if this department is going to 
work, that the President be able to take the twenty-two different personnel systems [ ... ] and 
meld them, together in a way that we [ ... ] make an effective agency to combat terrorism. The 
agility of the terrorist needs to be matched by a more agile federal workforce. '>63 
In addressing management issues, the members of the G-5 were advised by OMB 
Director Daniels to include ideas from the President's Management Agenda. The need for 
reform in personnel management was so evident to the G-5 that they spent very little time in 
deciding that personnel management reform would be part of the DHS legislation.54 Bruce 
Lawlor stated: 
It wasn't a big debate. This represents an opportunity to change the way federal civil 
service is wrought. And we need to do that; it's in desperate need of reform. There 
was nobody there that didn't think it was in desperate need of reform. So, to that 
extent, the decision to do it was very easy and not contentious. I don't want to say the 
decision was made lightly, but I don't think it was ever a debate.65 
On Capitol Hill, Congress seemed most troubled by budget and reorganization 
authorities and their effects on congressional authorization and appropriations processes and 
committees.66 Concern over the personnel management flexibilities would come later. 
3. Drafting Legislation 
63 Rep. Rob Portman, "Homeland Security Legislation." Interview by Margaret Warner on PBS OnLine 
NewsHour, July 26, 2002. Available online from http://www.pbs.orginewshour/bb/congress/july-dec02lhsl_7-
26.html 
54 Richard Falkenrath, interview. 
65 Bruce Lawlor, interview. 
66 Brad Berenson, interview by authors, 31 October 2005. 
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The President's original proposal was presented as a concept. It was not presented in 
legislative language. The G-5 thought there would be ample time to take an organized 
approach to writing the legislation. But, as Falkenrath explains, there was only a short period 
of time between the announcement and the need to submit legislative language. 
Speaker Hastert looked at the calendar and said, "Alright, Mr. Vice President. We'll 
do this. But you've got to give me the language [ ... J in five days." We weren't 
prepared to do that. We'd done really good fact sheets and press releases and all that, 
little booklets and stuff, but legislative language to transmit to the Hill-we still had 
to prepare it. So, we're like: "Oh my God. What are we going to doT' We got a 
legislative drafting expert out of DOJ, had him assigned to the White House, and 
really quickly put together a 38-page bill. That was what we transmitted to the Hil1.67 
Berenson also discussed the short period of time to produce the legislative language. 
Originally, we had about four weeks to write the bill. However, the Vice President 
and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert made a deal to get the bill to Capitol Hill 
quickly in order to get it passed by the August recess.68 
Coordination of the legislative drafting was assigned to Brad Berenson. When it carne 
time to write the legislative language on personnel management, the G-5 turned to the Office 
of Personnel Management for drafting assistance. OPM formed its own small working group. 
According to OPM's Ed Flynn, that language was constructed essentially by a group of five 
people at OPM: Jeff Sumberg, Deputy Assistant Director for Workforce Relations; Ed 
Hickey, Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff Paul Conway and Senior Advisor for Homeland 
Security; John Landers, of the OPM Retirement Policy Division; Harry Wolf, from 
Congressional Relations; and Flynn.59 Significantly, the draft included the Director of OPM, 
along with the Secretary of Homeland Security, as jointly responsible for any new 
57 Richard Falkenrath, interview with author. 
68 Brad Berenson, interview with author. 
69 Ed Flynn, interview by authors, 28 August 2005. 
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regulations. This served to institutionalize a role for OPM in the design and operation of any 
new personnel management system for DHS. 
According to Berenson, 
[1] put together a legislative drafting team. This group sub-delegated some of the 
drafting work to OMB for contracting issues and OPM for the personnel provisions. I 
was put in charge of the process for writing the legislation. This would be the first 
time the President had sent actual bill language to Congress because all previous 
proposals had been outlines or concepts [ ... ] We worked around the clock. So, we 
didn't have a lot of time to tinker with what we received from OMB and OPM. We 
might have kicked the tires a little, but we basically just dropped their work into the 
bilFo 
The entire bill comprised only thirty-eight pages. The language developed by the 
staff group was an attempt to use simpler wording and delegated authority. Richard 
Falkenrath explained, 
We did it the old-fashioned way which says, "There shall be created a Department. 
All powers are vested in the Secretary. The Secretary shall have all total control over 
the Department. The Department shall consist of the following assets and authorities 
which shall be transferred to him. He shall then have the authority to reorganize, 
reprogram, etc. He shall have the authority to promulgate new personnel regulations, 
notwithstanding Title 5." It was an ideal way of legislating, which is just very short, 
simple, granted authority, the way they used to do it in Congresses 1 through 50.71 
Section (a) of the personnel management provision of the proposed bill contains just 
sixty-eight words: 
70 Ibid. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title [Title 5], the Secretary of 
Homeland Security may, in regulations prescribed jointly with the Director of 
the Office of Personnel Management, establish, and from time to time adjust, 
a human resources management system for some or all of the organizational 
units of the Department of Homeland Security, which shall be flexible, 
71 Richard Falkenrath, interview. 
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contemporary, and grounded in the public employment principles of merit and 
fitness72 
Section (b) required simply that any new system be "flexible and "contemporary," 
preserve the principles of merit and fitness, not waive equal employment or other employee 
rights and remedies, ensure the right to organize and bargain collectively, and made certain 
pay provisions non-waivable. This section also contained a five year sunset provision on 
authority to issue new regulations.73 
This provision of the HSA introduced the most dramatic potential shift in the 
direction of federal personnel management flexibility since CSRA, perhaps even since the 
Pendleton Act. Writing in general language to empower the Secretary and OPM Director to 
establish new personnel management practices, avoided time-consuming debate over the 
details of any such plan. Director James explained, "Our initial take at this was: let's make 
the legislation as broad as possible so that we could have the freedom to fill in the details as 
we went along.,,74 
The administration's bill, HR 5005 was introduced in the House on June 24, 2002 
with expectations that it would pass quickly. After all, the idea of a homeland security 
agency had originated in the Senate and, politically, it seemed that few officeholders would 
want to stand in the way of a homeland security bill, especially in an election year. However, 
strong opposition was encountered in the Senate, largely due to strong union opposition to 
the personnel provisions. 
72 U. S. Congress, House, 10th Congress, Second Session, H.R. 5005, Section 761, introduced June 25, 2002. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Kay Coles James, interview by authors, 23 September 2005. 
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3. Opposition Emerges 
The first signs that the bill's personnel management language might cause political 
problems emerged quickly. Those key words, "notwithstanding any other provision ... " 
immediately triggered a problem. As Falkenrath describes: 
We had no idea what we were "notwithstanding." Title 5 is a big Title. It turns out 
Title 5 contains whistleblower protections. So, within two days the unions are putting 
out a press release that says the President wants to end whistleblower protections. 
Well, that's nonsense. We don't want to end whistleblower protections. We wanted to 
give the Secretary the authority to write new regulations for the personnel system, 
notwithstanding what had come before.75 
When asked if the G-5 group had anticipated opposition, Bruce Lawlor stated, "Yeah, 
we knew that. .. we expected that. But, hey we were building the biggest organization since 
World War II. Who cared?,,76 
It turned out that the major public-sector unions cared a lot. Still smarting from the 
revocation of the Clinton-era labor partnerships, union leaders saw the HSA personnel 
provisions as just one more piece of evidence that the Bush administration was out to break 
the unions. In labor's view, the administration wanted to "eliminate collective bargaining 
rights [ ... ] and exercise unchecked power over federal workers."?? Moreover, the union 
leadership was bothered by the lack of consultation. In the words of AFGE president Bobby 
Harnage, the administration's approach showed "arrogance and the impatience": 
I think they got to looking at it and saying, "You know, these guys don't want to 
change. We're wasting our time talking with them. We've got the support of 
Congress. With the American public behind us, all we've got to do is scream, 
'Homeland Security.' Let's just do it." They didn't want to be confused with 
facts, and they didn't want too many people adding to it because that made it a 
75 Richard Falkenrath, interview. 
76 Bruce Lawlor, interview. 
77 AFL-CIO, "The Department of Homeland Security," Executive Council Resolution, 6 August 2002. 
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little more confusing. So, you had this group that was put together, sat down 
and drafted it exactly the way it was wanted. [ ... ] That's a very poor way to do 
business.7B 
The fight over the DHS bill became, in large part, a fight over personnel management 
rules. John Gartland agrees, "it was the personnel reforms. That's what the unions had a real 
problem with. You had the biggest change in the civil service since the civil service was born 
in 1978. You gave authority to the new Secretary, and OPM. That never had been done 
before.,,79 The struggle over the personnel reform portion of the HSA led to delayed action in 
the Senate past the one-year anniversary of 9/11 and up to the mid-term elections of 2002. 
C. Homeland Security and the Fight over Personnel Management 
The focus of action on homeland security shifted to Capitol Hill, where the 
administration, Democrats and RepUblicans in the House and Senate, and union leaders each 
adopted processes and strategies to deal with the issues. The longest-lasting and most 
divisive issues were the questions of personnel management. 
1. Congress takes up the Legislation 
Homeland Security Advisor Tom Ridge and OPM Director Kay Cole James were the 
prime advocates for the administration on Capitol Hill, testifying before committees and 
persuading Senators and House members. Director James recalls, 
I remember the first time I was called over to the White House for one of those 
meetings with legislators. The President talked about the legislation and how 
important it was, and the first thing out of the box was the personnel issue. So 
78 Bobby Harnage, interview by authors, 3 April 2006. 
79 John Gartland, interview. 
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the President said, "Kay why don't you ... [brief us on the issues?] I was at 
every meeting at the White House, and I always had to make the case."80 
Congressional action began in the House and Senate almost simultaneously, but on 
different legislative proposals. In the Senate, on June 24th, the Government Affairs 
Committee favorably voted the Lieberman Bill (S. 2452) out of committee. This was the 
same day that the administration's bill, HR 5005 was introduced in the House. In the House, 
Speaker Hastert appointed a nine-member Select Committee, chaired by Majority Leader 
Dick Armey, to coordinate the House legislative process on this legislation. Optimism still 
prevailed. On July 16th , Senator Lieberman offered his prediction of the schedule for this 
legislation. 
The House will take the proposal up [ ... ] next week. Our committee [will] mark 
up our bill in the Senate next Wednesday, take it to the floor the following 
week, and if all goes well, these bills will pass both houses before [ ... ] the 
August recess and our conference committee will work together and I think as 
early as September we'll bring out a common bill to the floor of each house.81 
The Senate Committee moved first, on the Lieberman Bill, but the House was quicker 
to move on the administration's bill. As Falkenrath explains: 
The House was in Republican control. They set up this unbelievable forced 
march in July where they took our bill and simultaneously referred it to 13 
committees, full committees of jurisdiction and all done simultaneously. I 
mean in one week they all had hearings and everything. And then they all 
marked up, and they all transmitted their mark-ups to the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security whose nine members then dealt with their mark-ups, and 
basically, that's where the deal in the House got done.82 
Committee hearings and mark-up sessions went on in all of the committees immediately; all 
the committees discharged their bills on July Ith. Once the House committees reported their 
80 Kay Cole James, interview. 
81 Senator Joseph Liebennan, interview. PBS Online NewsHour, 16 July 2002. 
82 Richard Falkenrath, interview. 
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mark-ups, the Select Committee acted quickly to bring a bill to the floor. The bill provided 
the Secretary of DHS with greater management flexibility in the areas of performance 
appraisal, job classification, pay rates and systems, labor management systems, and adverse 
actions and appeals. The bill also provided civil rights and disabled protections, preserved 
veteran's preferences in hiring, and assured that the Fair Labor Standards Act, Social 
Security Act and the Family and Medical leave Act would continue to apply to federal 
employment. The bill also preserved the workers' right to organize, but continued the 
president's authority to limit collective bargaining for national security reasons and extended 
this authority to the secretary.83 
The House took up the bill on July 26. Six amendments were defeated on close 
party-line votes. The House passed the bill on a vote of295 to 132. 
The bill now moved to the Senate, where two cloture motions were made to try to 
bring a bill the floor. Both were withdrawn, and Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle 
announced that a vote on the bill would be put off until after the August Congressional 
recess. The real fight over the bill would take place in the Senate. Falkenrath explains, 
In the Senate, there was a totally different dynamic where Lieberman was in 
charge of this issue. There was no simultaneous referral; there was a single 
referral to Government Affairs Committee. He thought he could write this bill. 
He had a bunch of hearings and a bunch of thoughts. He had his staffers 
working on it, and he was talking to members. And he really thought he was 
going to write this bill. What he was coming up with was just unacceptable to us 
on many fronts--especially on this one [personnel provisions]. I mean, on this 
one he was totally captive to the unions and gave us nothing. I mean, actually 
83 U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Homeland Security, "Transforming Government for the 21 st 
Century: Summary ofH.R. 5005, July 23, 2002; pp. 2-3. 
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restricting the Executive in some ways. It was just totally unacceptable. It was 
not the only unacceptable thing, but it was totally unacceptable.84 
When the Senate returned to Washington after the summer recess, the bill was 
brought to the floor for consideration on twelve days between September 4 and September 25 
before returning it to committee. 
As the debate raged on and off the Senate floor, it became more political and more 
partisan. The administration began portraying the Democrats in Congress as special interest 
supporters and against the nation's security. A search of the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents from August through the November 5 election revealed over three 
dozen public statements by President Bush in which he criticized the Senate or blamed 
"special interests" connected to Democrats for the delay in the homeland security bil1.85 
Senate Republican Leader Trent Lott was quoted as saying, "The homeland security 
department is being blocked by Senate Democrats who are determined to protect the interests 
of their union bosses in the bureaucracy.,,86 Maureen Gilman, NTEU Director of Legislation, 
argues that it was the Republicans that had been preventing votes from taking place: 
[T]hroughout the whole thing, the administration and their Republican allies on the 
Hill were much more successful than we and the Democrats on the Hill were in [ ... ] 
the public relations aspects of who was holding this up. I think there were six cloture 
votes that the Democrats wanted. Republicans voted that down but were still able to 
maintain the idea that the Democrats are preventing the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security. And it actually went through the election that 
way.87 
84 Richard Falkenrath, interview. 
85Richard S. Conley, "The War on Terrorism and Homeland Security," 5. 
86 Adriel Bettelheim, "Senate's Failure to Resolve Personnel Management Issue Stalls Homeland Security Bill," 
CQ Weekly, 19 October 2002. 
87 Maureen Gilman, interview by authors, 22 September 2005. 
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Ridge and James assert that they were open to working with the unions. Ridge 
explains, "We spent a lot of time assuring them [legislators] that we would engage with the 
unions, and we did seriously consider many of their objections and recommendations."88 
They claim also to have been willing to make deals and concessions to get the bill passed. 
According to Kay Cole James, "We were willing to put a lot on the table. At first I don't 
know if they really believed we had the authority to do that and could deliver. But we did.,,89 
NTEU President Colleen Kelly describes these interactions somewhat differently: "Any time 
I requested a meeting, we got a meeting. [ ... ] [T]he issue was just that very often the 
conversation that would seem to me was going very well [ ... ] and then we would leave the 
room, and they would go right back to where they started from.,,90 
As the midtenn elections drew nearer, however, the willingness of the administration 
to make deals or grant concessions decreased. NTEU's Maureen Gilman says, "We were 
working with Senators Chaffee, Nelson and Breaux to get a compromise. We were willing to 
give up virtually anything, [ ... ] but as they got closer to the election they wanted this political 
issue. They did not want a compromise.,,91 Brad Berenson seems to mirror this viewpoint 
from the other side. 
We were willing to make compromises and worked with some on the Hill such as 
Senators Nelson, Breaux, and Chaffee. At some point, Senator Daschle must have 
decided that he couldn't go into the elections without the public sector unions behind 
the Democrats, and he probably felt that the Democrats were safe on the security 
issue because of their support of the Iraq resolution. It was becoming clear that our 
efforts at reaching a compromise were being frustrated by the leadership. We were 
88 Tom Ridge, interview by authors, 17 January 2006. 
89 Kay Cole James, interview. 
90 Colleen Kelly, interview. 
91 Maureen Gilman, interview. 
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astounded, but tried to keep going. Finally, the [White House] Legislative Oversight 
Group decided to quit trying to reach an agreement. [ ... ] Compromise could have 
been reached; we were willing to do things.92 
No compromise was reached, however, and the issue remained undecided as Congress 
headed into the November elections. 
2. The Issues 
There were clear differences between the administration and the unions on real issues 
that were important for both. Each side also had a different perception what the fight was all 
about. The two major issue areas under debate were: (1) management flexibility to fix a 
broken personnel management system versus (2) collective bargaining agreements and the 
rights of organized workers. 
For the administration and its supporters, the issue was about providing the "flexible" 
tools for management to use to deploy and manage employees in the new Department. Since 
the Bush administration had already begun to pursue a management reform agenda that 
included reforms in human capital management, HSA provided an opportunity for them to 
advance this agenda, and they took the opportunity. The administration believed that the 
entire federal government needed personnel management reform, but in this case, they 
argued that reforms were particularly necessary for the urgent mission of DHS. Rep. 
Portman said the President was asking for "some basic flexibilities in the area of pay, 
performance, classification and in appeals and adverse actions [ ... ] the kind of managerial 
and the kind of personnel flexibility he's going to need.,,93 Senator Fred Thompson argued 
92 Brad Berenson, interview. 
93 Rob Portman, "Homeland Security Legislation." 
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that the mission ofDHS required a new approach, "We can't operate the Homeland Security 
Department the way so many other departments have been operated with the waste and 
inefficiency that we've seen. So this is a monumental step in the right direction."94 
During the debate, reform supporters were asked to provide examples that illustrated 
the need for personnel management changes. In response, the administration noted the 
difficulty in relocating people quickly, offered a hypothetical example of the difficulty in 
firing a drunken border guard, and cited union rules that interfered with workers wearing 
radiation detecting devices. All of these examples would themselves become problematic 
and debatable. Nevertheless, the administration's argument was supported by a widespread 
belief that the civil service system was rules-bound, unresponsive, outmoded and in need of 
improvement. 
Union leaders saw this issue in a different light; they disputed the details of the 
proposal and also questioned the motives behind them. Brian DeWyngaert, Assistant to the 
President of AFGE, saw the reforms as an attempt by the administration to weaken the civil 
service system, to shift from "public administration" to "political administration."95 
De Wyngaert cites a paper, written by two former Republican personnel management 
officials, that asserts, "The President can expect opposition from official Washington's 
'permanent government,' a network that includes the career civil service, and its allies in 
Congress, the leaders of federal unions, and the chiefs of managerial and professional 
94 Senator Fred Thompson, "Congress Goes Back to Work," Interview, PBS Online News Hour, 12 November 
2002. 
95 Brian DeWyngaert, interview by the authors, 19 January 2006. 
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associations representing civil servants."96 De Wyngaert expresses union distrust of the 
administration, arguing that the real goal of the administration was to "control what agencies 
do [ ... ] to change some of the personnel rules [ ... ] to the point where they are going to follow 
your line because you control their pay, their determination at will, their layoff."97 
There were also questions about whether the administration had election-year politics 
in mind. Since the administration had initially opposed creation of a new department, 
Colleen Kelly suggests the White House had decided that if it were going to bow to pressure 
from Congressional Democrats on this issue, they would "'put something in there to make it 
really difficult for the Democrats [ ... ] as they move toward the next election.' And this was 
the personnel provision."98 But Bruce Lawlor denies any political motivation on the part of 
the 0-5: "there was never, for a minute, any political motivation behind trying to change the 
civil service system [ ... ] The only direction he [Card] ever gave us was 'Do the right thing. 
You do what you think is right. We'll worry about the politics ifit comes to that."'99 
Adding to the suspicions about motives, the revocation of the Clinton-era partnerships 
and the denial of organizing rights at the Justice Department on national security grounds 
gave reason for labor leaders to fear that the administration was pursuing an agenda to 
weaken the federal unions. Colleen Kelly asserts, "The Homeland Security Act became the 
96 George Nesterczuk, with Donald Devine and Robert E. Moffitt, Taking Charge of Federal Personnel, 
Heritage Foundation, 10 January 2001. 
97 Brian DeWyngaert, interview. 
98 Colleen Kelly, interview. 
99 Bruce Lawlor, interview. 
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vehicle that they had been looking for forever [ ... J to take away existing civil service rights. 
[ ... ] They saw their opportunity and they used it."1OO 
This fight coalesced over the question of the President's authority to abrogate 
collective bargaining agreements ifhe deems it a national security necessity. Presidents have 
had this authority for over thirty years, but union leaders and their supporters feared its use 
by this administration. Rep. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) explained: 
A variety of rights-whistIeblower protection, collective bargaining rights, and 
other important issues [ ... J-will in essence be subject to being waived by a 
presidential determination that this is a national security interest. [ ... ] The reality 
is that the president earlier this year used those similar provisions in reference to 
the US Attorney's Office where over 500 individuals who were seeking to be 
unionized were suddenly taken away of all of their rights including their right to 
collectively bargain.101 
The unions and their supporters tried to address this question through bill language that 
would restrict the President's authority. The original Lieberman bill contained very little 
language about management other than Section 106--which addressed sound financial and 
fiscal management principles and environmental, safety and health requirements. 102 A 
provision to limit the President's ability to abrogate union agreements on national security 
grounds was added to the Lieberman bill and on the House floor; Rep. Morella offered 
amendments to HR 5005 to address these union concerns. Senator Thomson argued the 
administration's position: 
Here is authority that presidents have had ever since the days of Jimmy 
Carter. Democrat and Republican presidents both have had a right to' 
abrogate collective bargaining agreements in the interest of national 
100 Colleen Kelly, interview. 
101 Rep. Robert Menendez, "Homeland Security Legislation," Interview, PBS OnLine NewsHour, 26 July 2002. 
102Joseph Leibennan, "To Establish the Department of National Security and the National Office for Combating 
Terrorism," 107th Congress, 2nd Session, S. 2452, Library of Congress, 2 May 2002. 
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security on particular occasions. The president simply wanted to keep the 
same authority that these other presidents had. 103 
The efforts to amend the president's authority failed, but they fueled the key debate. 
Colleen Kelley reflects: 
There was the collective bargaining issue, where there was a great deal of 
fear among the employees that were going to be put into the new 
department, that the President was just going to be able to issue an executive 
order and take away their bargaining rights. He clearly had that authority. 
We were trying to get a grandfather clause that said if your duties don't 
really change, the president can't just issue an executive order and take you 
out. I think things could have gone differently if we had not been pushing 
on the language to limit the president's authority. That's really what they 
picked up on.104 
This debate, now framed as national security vs. labor rights, would be taken into the 
November elections. 
3. Personnel Management Reform as an Election Issue 
Homeland security did become an issue in the fall 2002 election campaigns. In 
particular, the campaigns of two Senate Democrats, Jean Carnahan (MO) and Max Cleland 
(GA), were affected by campaigns that accused them of opposing the HSA. 105 The midtenn 
elections in Missouri and particularly Georgia became the most important elections for the 
Bush administration and its homeland security proposal. Campaign ads portrayed Senator 
Cleland, a triple amputee Vietnam War veteran, as anti-national security and pro-special 
interest.106 President Bush visited Missouri several times in October and November to lend 
103 Senator Fred Thompson, "Congress Goes Back to Work." Interview by Gwen Ifill on PBS Online News 
Hour, 12 November 2002, available online from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/congress/july-
dec02ilameduck 11-12.html 
104 Colleen Kelly, interview. 
105 Donald P. Moynihan, "Homeland Security," 181. 
106 Rich Lowry, "Max Cleland, Liberal Victim: Election Mythology," National Review Online, 20 February 
2004. 
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support to Rep. Jim Talent's senatorial bid against incumbent Jean Carnahan, arguing at one 
campaign stop that "Jim Talent understands what I'm talking about. You put him in the 
Senate; we'll get us a good homeland security bill, which will make it easier for presidents to 
protect America."107 
Colleen Kelly, President of the NTEU, reflected, "They framed those who were in the 
Democratic Party supporting us, and even the one or two Republicans or Independents who 
were on our side-to keep this thing alive-they framed them as unpatriotic."108 John 
Gartland, dismayed that that the bill had not been voted on by the Senate prior to the mid-
term election break, stated, "At that time, I thought we were dead, because I never realized 
what was going on in Georgia to defeat Cleland using this issue."109 Washington Post 
columnist Stephen Barr observed, "The defeat of Max Cleland, a Vietnam war veteran who 
said that labor rights and employee rights should not be changed and who then goes down in 
defeat in his home state, left Democrats very embittered on this front."110 
The election had its impact, but was introducing civil service reform into the 
homeland security bill part of a deliberate Republican election strategy? Colleen Kelly 
suggests that it was: 
They could put the Democratic candidates, especially in the Senate, on the 
hot seat for the election. They didn't have much at risk because their move 
to create a department was a defensive political move. [ ... J SO they could 
107 George Bush, "Remarks at Southwest Missouri State University," Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents, Week Ending 18 October 2002,1801. 
108 Colleen Kelly, interview. 
109 John Gartland, interview. 
110 Stephan Barr, interview by authors, 23 September 2005. 
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throw it out there and say, "OK Democrats, you're either going to hurt your 
union friends or you're going to vote to create this department."111 
Senator Thompson denies that the issue was deliberately set up for the elections, saying, "I 
don't think anyone was holding out simply to have an election year issue." Nevertheless, 
Senator Breaux observed, "I can give you the names of a number of people who are not 
going to be back from Congress in January as a result of this issue. It was a big political 
issue.,,112 
When the results from the midterm elections were in, the administration had gained a 
Republican majority in the Senate and enough support to pass H.R. 5005 with the 
management flexibilities provision intact. 
4. The Return from the Mid-term Elections 
Prior to the election, the Senate had been split 50-50 between Democrats and 
Republicans. The Democratic election losses in Georgia and Missouri, along with 
Republican victories in Minnesota and North Carolina, gave the administration the needed 
Republican majority in the Senate. Coupled with Republican gains in the House, the election 
results were broadly interpreted as a national judgment on Bush's stand on homeland 
security.113 Passage of the HSA did not have to wait for a new Congress to be seated in 
January, however. Instead, Congress returned for a rare post-election "lame duck" session to 
take up the HSA. John Gartland explains, "It [the elections] sent a message back here. A 
bunch of other Democrats and RepUblicans, they quickly got along, and they passed that bill. 
111 Colleen Kelly, interview. 
112 Senator Fred Thompson, "Congress Goes back to Work."; Senator John Breaux, "Congress Goes Back to 
Work," interview, PBS Online NewsHour, 12 November 2002. 
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'Get it out of here ! Look at what happened to Cleland and others' ."114 Colleen Kelly, 
president ofNTEU, also credited the election results as leading to passage of the bill: 
Well, in the end it went through because of the mid-term elections. I like to 
think we'd still be fighting about it even if it was a very narrow margin 
keeping the debate alive. So, the only reason it ended was because of the 
results of the mid-term election. And seeing people like Max Cleland being 
portrayed as unpatriotic because he supported the rights of the employees who 
provide the protection on the front lines everyday. I'll never forget those mid-
term elections. I knew that night what was going to happen. And it did. You 
know, within two weeks they acted on the legislation.115 
After the elections, the House language was generally just inserted into the Senate 
bill, and last-minute compromises were reached on some key issues. A final deal struck 
between the White House and Senators John Breaux (D-LA), Ben Nelson (D-NE) and 
Lincoln Chaffee (R-RI) provided that DHS would collaborate with unions before any rule 
changes and that the President must notify Congress and wait ten days before waiving union 
agreements for national security reasons. Such waivers would be limited to a four-year 
period 
The final language on personnel management therefore amounted to considerably 
more than the original proposal. Title VII, Subtitle G, Section 761 adds a new Chapter 97 to 
Title 5 for the management of personnel in DHS. It includes the broader language of the 
House bill as further amended in the Senate. In addition, a significant other amendment, 
championed by Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) incorporated as Title XIII of the HAS, 
establishes new Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) throughout the agencies of the 
federal government. It also sets new requirements for OPM to establish systems, standards, 
114 John Gartland, interview. 
115 Colleen Kelly, interview. 
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and metrics for assessing the management of human capital. Though managerial in its focus, 
the CHCO provision can be viewed as an additional civil service reform, applicable 
government-wide, accomplished through the vehicle of the HSA. 
The authority for the secretary and director of OPM to establish a new personnel 
management system for DHS was retained. Senator Fred Thompson, Ranking Republican on 
the Government Affairs Committee said: 
The president wanted for the administration to be able to put into effect some 
new rules and regulations. Workers rights are still going to be protected [ ... ] but 
it takes too long to hire. It takes too long to get rid of people who need to be 
moving on. It takes too many levels of appeals and so forth. The president 
needed some flexibility. He will be given that flexibility now.116 
On the Senate floor, Senate Amendment (S. Arndt.) 4901, the final HSA language 
was proposed by Senator Thompson. In a last ditch effort to block the bill, Senator 
Lieberman proposed S. Arndt. 4902 to create instead a National Commission on Terrorist 
Attack upon the United States. A cloture vote was passed 65-29 to limit debate and permit 
the vote. S. Arndt. 4901 passed in the Senate 90-9 on November 19. The House of 
Representatives subsequently passed it on November 22nd• President George W. Bush signed 
PL. 107-269 on November 25, 2002. 
116 Senator Fred Thompson, "Congress Goes Back to Work."; Senator John Breaux, "Congress Goes Back to 
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President George W. Bush addresses the media during the signing of the Homeland Security Act in the 
East Room Monday, November 25. White House photo by Paul Morse. 
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IV. Argument Comparison Before and After 9/11 
A. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we described the chronology of events that led to the passage 
of the HSA of 2002, including the recent history of attempts at civil service reform since the 
Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978. Within the context of this case history, we 
introduced some of the key arguments made by both proponents and opponents of the 
personnel management reforms. Interestingly, many of the proponents' arguments had been 
made by previous administrations but had not led to legislative and organizational changes. 
Several interview participants suggested that national security and 9/11 played a large role in 
the adoption of proposed personnel management reforms in the HSA. Consequently, we set 
out to investigate more closely the claim that 9/11 and national security were key to the 
passage of personnel management reforms. 
The following chapter explores whether and how the arguments in this case differ 
from that of previous reform attempts. 
B. Materials and Method 
1. Materials 
To examine the arguments for personnel management reform, we consulted a variety 
of materials in the public record that illustrated both sides of the debate. Specifically, we 
searched for sources using research databases such as Lexis Nexis, Proquest, JSTOR, and the 
Homeland Security Digital Library, and we drew from a variety of materials including 
newspapers, scholarly reports, speech transcripts, congressional hearings, and other public 
accounts. Although we consulted many sources (including interview data) to gain general 
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background into the debate, we limited our actual data set to only those arguments that could 
be directly attributable to a specific source and are available in the public record. By limiting 
our data to directly attributed material, we reduced the risk of imposing third-party 
interpretation of specific arguments and instead only analyzed the terms of the argument as 
made by the original author/speaker/organization. In many cases, our evidence for arguments 
was in the form of direct quotations taken from hearings, speeches, press briefings, or other 
public events. In other cases, we relied on "talking points" issued as the official position of a 
participant in the debate, such as the American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE) union. In all cases, we consulted only those arguments that were in the public 
record. There is a particular utility in restricting our data to only those arguments made 
publicly; namely, such arguments would most likely be those which were circulated in the 
public sphere. In other words, in comparing the arguments both before and after 9/11, it is 
important to view the debate as the public viewed it in order to examine the potential effects 
of the arguments on those audiences. 
2. Method 
Once we gathered the materials for analysis, we reviewed the arguments categorizing 
them first as having been made either before or after 9/11, and second as either for or against 
personnel management reform. We then categorized the arguments into 10 primary themes to 
assess which arguments, if any, were distinct to each time period either prior to or following 
9/11. It is important to note that many of the arguments were related to one another; however, 
we categorized the arguments into themes based on those that seemed to be particularly 
prevalent throughout the debate. Our search for arguments reflects our intent to capture the 
entirety of the debate to the greatest extent possible. Whereas we may have missed some 
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sources in our search, we are confident that the primary, recurring arguments in the debate 
are reflected in our analysis. 
We make extensive use of italics throughout the analysis as a means to emphasize 
certain key points in the arguments. All use of italics, therefore, indicates our emphasis rather 
than the original speakers', unless otherwise noted. 
B. Findings 
Our analysis resulted in the isolation of 10 primary arguments, summarized as 
follows: 




(5) Broadbanding and Paybanding 
(6) Pay-for-Performance 
(7) Recruitment and Retention 
(8) Union Busting 
(9) The Party Line: Democrats vs. Republicans 
(l0) National Security 
Table 1, below, summarizes our findings. The sections that follow provide a narrative 
comparison of all arguments for personnel management reforms. 
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